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In 1933, Everett Colby, a lawyer and politician, sent a letter to his former 
classmate John D. Rockefeller Jr. informing him that he “can no longer advocate 
the entrance of the U. S. into the League.”1   In 1935, Rockefeller’s son and 
namesake, John D. Rockefeller III, wrote to Colby expressing concern about his 
father’s position vis-à-vis the League of Nations (League). He tried to persuade 
Colby to write again to Rockefeller and to support the international organization.2 
In a period of political and diplomatic turmoil in Europe and elsewhere, the 
League’s inability to cope with a rapid succession of crises (Ethiopia, Spain, 
Manchuria, and so on) seemed to leave the institution’ reputation in tatters. In 
this context, officers of the Rockefeller Foundation, which had previously 
supported the League’s activities, revealed that they now doubted the usefulness 
of the Geneva-based institution.  
In 1938, with shadows of war looming over Europe, the American journalist and 
League champion Arthur Sweetser sent a report about the League’s present 
situation to Foundation president Raymond Fosdick. His position was cautiously 
optimistic: “Some feel that the League had a terrible blow, which weakens it 
greatly; others that there will inevitably be a comeback at a not too distant date.” 
Foundation officers commented on Sweetser’s report in the margins of the letter. 
Next to Sweetser’s assertion that the League had been gravely damaged but 
would recover, an officer remarked, “quite moderate here.” Another officer, 
Sydnor H. Walker, made a sharply critical general assessment of Sweetser’s 
report: “Here is some Sweetserian philosophy! He has the soul of a Jesuit in my 
opinion. This is furthermore my idea of ineffective propaganda.”3 
Foundation officers were not alone in expressing doubts about the League. After 
its failures in the early 1930s, the League lost its luster in the United States even 
within traditionally internationalist political circles.4 Skepticism was also present 
in Geneva. The political crises of the period led the League officials to focus on 
so-called technical activities—the committees dealing with issues such as 
economics, finances, taxation, opium trade, labor conditions, or women 
trafficking. But this shift of interests was not an easy one either. The collapse of 
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the global economy since 1929 made it difficult to present the League as an 
institution capable of dealing with international economic problems. Moreover, 
both political and economic crises led many countries to abandon the League, 
causing dire budgetary problems for the organization. In response to these 
challenges, the League reinvented itself, not only by becoming an organization 
focused on technical issues, but also by transforming its technical bodies’ ideas 
and field of interests.5 The League’s economic thought and policies evolved from 
a desire to recover the golden era of laissez-faire prior to World War I to a more 
development-oriented ideology that included a wide gamut of social policies 
(nutrition, peasant welfare) as part of its views on economics.  League experts’ 
interests also became wider: the League’s technical bodies recast their activities 
on a global scale, paying more attention to regions such as Asia or Latin 
America.6 
Despite its hesitation, the Foundation continued to support and fund League 
activities in the 1930s and 1940s. Foundation officers and trustees and League 
experts were part of a coalition of liberal internationalists. The Foundation’s 
support was essential for the survival of the League in the 1940s. Their 
cooperation helped to shape “embedded liberalism,” that is, the idea that 
international free trade had to allow national states to intervene in their domestic 
economies to avoid depression and unemployment, which became the prevailing 
view on international economics after World War II. This cooperation was 
fraught with tensions, however, that resulted from the weakness of the League, 
but also from its “reinvention” and the extension of its activities to places like 
Latin America. Why did the Rockefeller Foundation maintain its support for the 
League against all odds? How should we interpret the tensions within the liberal 
internationalist coalition?  
Between Science and (International) Politics 
The Foundation’s support for the League’s “technical” activities became more 
important as the economic depression of the 1930s eroded the League’s budget. A 
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few examples will demonstrate the importance of the Foundation’s commitment 
to the League. In 1933, the foundation apportioned $125,000 over a period of five 
years to the Financial Section and Economic Intelligence Service of the 
Secretariat of the League for the accomplishment of its research projects and in 
1938 it committed $98,000 more. Between 1929 and 1942, the Foundation 
contributed more than $400,000 to the research tasks of the Economic 
Intelligence Service of the League.7 In the mid-1930s, a Foundation officer noted 
that “the whole of the activities of the Fiscal Committee (of the League) is now 
largely financed from the Foundation’s grant.”8 In the 1940s, the Foundation 
covered at least one third (and probably more) of the budgets of the League’s 
Economic and Financial Section.9 
This support contrasts with the doubts of the Foundation about the future of the 
League. Apparently, the political side of the League was a major hindrance. As 
Foundation officer John Van Sickle wrote in 1931, “The principal objection that 
might be raised to Foundation aid appears to lie in the danger that a group 
representing the League of Nations, and consequently fifty odd sovereign states, 
may not be able to pursue independent research involving criticism of 
government policy.” 10  That is, the Foundation’s goal was to support neutral 
scientific research, independent of political meddling. And yet, Foundation 
officers showed a constant, if vigilant, sympathy toward the League’s activities.  
Those who advocated that the Foundation continue to support the League made 
an effort to distinguish the technical from the political activities of the League 
and to emphasize the scientific work of the technical bodies. In November 1931, 
the economist John B. Condliffe, a member of the League’s economic secretariat, 
wrote to Edmund E. Day, director of the Foundation’s Division of Social Science: 
“In the Economic Intelligence Service…. we have quite a considerable degree of 
detachment from the current political problems which agitate the League and 
there is a thoroughly familiar research atmosphere.”11 Of course, Condliffe was an 
interested party, since he was working for the League and hoped the Foundation 
would continue funding the Economic and Finance section, but Foundation 
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officers held his opinion in high regard. John Van Sickle stated that “in the 
Economic and Finance Section of the League we have a research center of great 
potential importance. First-rate scholars are being attracted, and we may well 
cooperate in the better training of this personnel.” Selskar M. Gunn backed Van 
Sickle’s opinion: “JVS and I are favorably disposed. Of course, the position of the 
League has weakened a good deal these past months. This has been particularly 
on the political side. The League’s technical services may ultimately prove to be 
its most effective activities.”12 
Condliffe’s persuasiveness lay in his academic and personal prestige within the 
Foundation. He had been a Foundation grantee and was particularly trusted 
regarding the workings of the League’s Economic and Financial Section. The 
question of scientific expertise was a key criterion in Foundation officers’ 
decisions and Condliffe was seeking the Foundation’s support in order to 
continue the League’s research on economic cycles. After the beginning of the 
economic slump of 1929, growing unemployment became a matter of concern for 
Foundation officers. The study of the economic cycle promised to offer clues 
about economic movements and the possibilities for resuming growth and 
employment. As Van Sickle put it, “The central problem with which they the 
League’s Financial and Economic Intelligence Service are concerned falls 
squarely within one of our fields of major interests, viz, economic stabilization.”13 
League bureaucrats, aware of the interests of the Foundation’s directors, had long 
sought their support for this research. Arthur Sweetser wrote Selskar Gunn a 
letter in 1930 showing his interest in any aid the Foundation might be willing to 
extend to an “Institute in Vienna particularly concerned with the study of Trade 
Cycles” and presented the League as the most adequate body to accomplish much 
needed research into a critical situation: “the fact that there were ten million men 
out of work in the Western countries indicated a world crisis fundamental to all 
nations and pointed to a type of study which the League would seem well 
qualified to do.”14 
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The study of trade cycles brought the Foundation’s and the League’s interests 
together. This convergence was based on several commonalities. The first was the 
claim of both organizations to produce neutral, scientific knowledge or, as the 
League insisted, the pivotal role of experts in their activities. The statistical data 
accumulated by the League’s technical committees, which the Foundation 
considered a major achievement, were an important part of this knowledge. This 
knowledge was aimed at shaping an international liberal order. The League’s 
experts argued against nationalist policies, while the Foundation advocated 
greater American involvement internationally, particularly during the isolationist 
1920s. Second, the network of scientists and academics who provided invaluable 
advice to the Foundation overlapped with the very network of experts that the 
League’s technical bodies had begun to establish since the 1920s. Condliffe was 
not an isolated case. The main economist behind the Leagues’ study of business 
cycles was the Austrian Gottfried Haberler, who had also been part of the 
Viennese economist contacted by the Foundation in 1930. Furthermore, former 
Foundation grantees cooperated many times with the League’s bodies, while the 
Foundation frequently sought the advice of international economists linked to the 
League.  
The political crises within the League were to some extent challenging for the 
Foundation because they threatened the relationships between the two 
institutions. In July 1933, the Frenchman Joseph Avenol was appointed secretary 
general of the League, replacing the Briton Eric Drummond. Condliffe reported 
to Van Sickle that Avenol was “an excellent administrator and a very wise man—
on the whole an improvement upon his predecessor.” 15  On this occasion, 
Condliffe’s insider knowledge could not have been more mistaken. Avenol quickly 
revealed his fascist leanings and his differences with the liberal internationalism 
heralded by League experts and Foundation officers.16 In 1936, Avenol’s policies 
put the League’s relationships with the Foundation in jeopardy: “There has 
gradually been developing under Avenol’s direction,” a Foundation officer 
reported, “an increasing resistance, both to cooperation with non-official 
agencies, and to accepting funds from outside sources for the extension of the 
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activities of the Secretariat.”17 The Director of the League’s Economic, Financial, 
and Transit Department, Alexander Loveday—probably under Avenol’s 
influence—began to express doubts about asking for funding from the 
Foundation. He  was even reluctant to accept grantees from the Foundation for 
the  Financial and Economic Intelligence Services of the League. The 
Foundation’s officers were now anxious to keep the relationship alive: “Mr. 
Loveday’s attitude towards fellowship appointments is also something of a 
problem to us. As the months go by I am more and more uncertain of the use to 
which fellowships in the field of international relations can be well put.”18 The 
officers of the Foundation even considered the possibility of asking Foundation 
president Raymond Fosdick, “to take the matter up personally with Avenol.”19 
Since scientists were the channel of communication between the Foundation and 
the League, they also expressed the tensions between the organizations. In 1936, 
Condliffe announced that he would resign his position within the Secretariat of 
the League. The economist expressed to his friends within the Foundation his 
disappointment with the working of the League and in particular the dominance 
of politicians over scientists within the organization: “My position in the 
Secretariat is somewhat peculiar in its semi-detached scientific character. From 
time to time Loveday has been kind enough to consult me on various points; but 
he bears the responsibility for the Section and it is not in my province to advise or 
act except through him . . . in sic big administrative machine with delicate 
political problems, a temporary member of section sic as I am cannot do more 
than act loyally through his Director and the Director has to consider many other 
aspects of a particular problems than scientific desirability.” 20  Condliffe’s 
correspondence with the Foundation shows how the international network of 
scientists and experts built by the Foundation enabled those professionals to 
proceed with their careers while at the same time providing the Foundation with 
valuable information about the internal working of the organizations they were 
funded but it also shows the limits of that information. Condliffe’s frustration 
with the League was related to fact that he was impeded from attending a 1936 
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Preparatory Meeting of Experts of the International Studies Conference, a 
gathering aimed at discussing possible studies on raw materials and international 
trade. Condliffe understood that he was the most appropriate expert to attend 
that meeting and put the blame for his absence on Loveday and the political 
machinery of the League. Foundation correspondence shows that disagreements 
between the representatives of the British Empire and Avenol were also behind 
this move.21 Nevertheless, the tensions between the Foundation and the League 
ebbed and flowed between 1937 and 1940, related to Avenol’s voluble attitude 
toward the United States and the League’s need for funds. 
 In spite of all the problems, the Foundation was not supporting science for the 
sake of science and the political character of the League was, in fact, an asset. 
Sometimes this was explained in paradoxical terms: “The technical organisations 
of a political body such as the League of Nations are in practice much freer of 
political influence than almost any other international organisation, for the 
obvious reason than in a body like the League politics are played on the political 
field and the time of politicians is not wasted by a futile endeavor to play them 
elsewhere.”22 But the absence of political influence was a way to achieve truly 
political impact. The measures recommended by the experts in Geneva had to be 
apply by national governments worldwide. Edmund Day made explicit the 
Foundation’s reasons for being involved in League activities: “If the Foundation 
wanted simply to stress disinterested objectivity, he could see no reason for 
supporting organizations like the ILO, the Financial Section of the League or the 
Institute of Pacific Relations. If, however, the Foundation were interested in the 
development of research as an aid to administration and policy-making, then it 
ought to be interested in just such organization as these.”23 These words not only 
show Foundation officers’ interest in shaping national governments’ policies, but 
also their belief in the impact of international organizations on domestic policies. 
This is key for understanding the Foundation’s support for the League.  
Of course, this was a technocratic approach to both domestic and international 
politics, and hence the Foundation’s insistence on solid scientific knowledge as 
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the pillar for any recommendation. This had been a traditional position of the 
Foundation, which since an early phase backed a more active involvement of the 
US federal government in the shaping of its society.24 In the international field, 
the Foundation supported the creation in 1931 of the Public Administration 
Clearing House and the activities of the International Institute of Administrative 
Sciences. Both organizations promoted a discussion of politics as the science of 
administration. 25  The global depression of the 1930s brought changed the 
landscape for the Foundation, both in the international and in the domestic 
arenas. In the international one, as has been mentioned, the League’s experts 
evolved toward a more active stance in economics. In the domestic field, the 
Franklin D. Roosevelt administration moved government intervention in the 
economy into a higher gear. Amidst a scenario of waste caused by the economic 
slump, the idea of planning gained international acceptance.  
In 1931, the Foundation’s attendee at a Geneva meeting of business and 
government representatives to discuss the depression expressed surprise at the 
lack of proposals for greater state intervention to solve economic problems: “I 
was struck with the fact that few suggestions of governmental action were 
brought forward.” 26  One of the Foundation’s goals was to persuade 
representatives of business that planning was a rational policy within a liberal 
context. Here, again, the agendas of the New Deal, the “reinvention” of the 
League, and the Foundation converged.27 
Roosevelt’s new interventionism meant a challenge for big business and it 
surprised even the Foundation’s technocratic-oriented officers. In response to 
this challenge, some businessmen and some officers of the Foundation resorted 
to a view of politics as limited to technical and administrative matters. This 
conception converged with the idea of the  need for international organizations. 
In 1934, Edmund Day, director of the Foundation’s Social Science Division, 
addressed these problems in a meeting of businessmen and notables in 
Philadelphia. Day shared businessmen’s fears about Roosevelt’s policies and a 
new era of mass mobilization. It was necessary to content democratic pressures 
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by “educating our people to the fact that there are certain problems which can’t 
properly be resolved by popular referendum.” Yet, the solution was not a return 
to a laissez-faire order. Planning would remain a permanent feature of modern 
societies. The goal was to create an able civil service, staffed with competent 
people, “the right kind of government administration, the right kind of political 
machinery.” This recipe was not only applicable to domestic policy. In fact, 
competent administration and planning was key in the international arena, as 
well. As Day saw it, the discussion was not between free-trade and protectionism, 
but between rational and irrational positions: “we have to have planning for the 
simple reason that we must have a measure of reason in the direction of our 
economic interest.”28 
A similar line emerged at the Planning Conference organized by the Public 
Administration Clearing House in Chateau d’Ardennes (Belgium) in September 
1937. The conference discussed the possibilities of conducting political and 
economic planning without eroding the liberal, capitalist economy. The reporter 
for the Foundation, Max Nicholson, argued that, in order to accomplish that goal, 
“planners must devote more attention than heretofore to the international 
aspects of their problems.”29 Domestic economic planning therefore had to be 
harnessed to an international framework. 
The convergence of ideas among the Foundation, the US government, and the 
League begs the question of who was setting the agenda. This is a difficult issue, 
because research projects and interests often originated in this very convergence 
of ideas and as a result of discussions and meetings among experts, academics, 
and politicians. It is possible to argue that in the 1920s, particularly in the field of 
health, the Foundation opened the way and that its activities in Latin America 
constituted a model for League plans for the region. In the 1930s, the Great 
Depression introduced some novelties. The shifts in the League’s interests 
influenced—in twisted ways—the programs that the Foundation decided to 
support. The previously mentioned case of the study of business cycles is one 
example. Supporting the lines of inquiry designed by the League’s experts fit well 
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into the Foundation’s philosophy of encouraging independent scientific research: 
“Would be more in accord with principles in RF if we did not designate specific 
subjects. Simply to prove League with something analogous to a fluid research 
fund which they could direct. Would institute new machinery to safeguard from 
political interference.”30  
There were strong links between the Foundation and US government agencies 
and officials. In fact, many of the Foundation’s trustees and officers had or would 
have experience as public servants. The political agenda, particularly in the field 
of foreign affairs, was set by the interaction between government officials and 
Foundation representatives. The Foundation’s connections with the federal 
government also allowed the organization to gain access to information about the 
League’s activities. For example, in the case of the business cycles study, in March 
1931 the League called a meeting in Geneva of representatives of national 
economic councils and research institutes. Edward Eyre Hunt, the head of a US 
government committee devoted to tackling unemployment, attended the meeting 
and reported on it for the Foundation.31  Thus, the connections between the 
League and the Foundation were not only based on scientific activities. On the 
one hand, the Foundation kept the US government connected to Geneva in a 
period of isolationist tendencies. On the other hand, the US government had 
never completely detached itself from the League, and interest in a regime of 
international governance became more pressing among US authorities in the 
atmosphere of economic depression and international conflicts of the 1930s.32 
The League had to offer the Foundation attractive projects. It needed the 
Foundation, and not only for economic reasons. Rockefeller support was also 
viewed as a way to entice the US government to commit itself to the League. In 
fact, the Foundation acted as a sort of lubricant between the US authorities and 
the League’s technical bodies. Even during the 1920s, many US experts 
participated in the League’s technical committees, which created important 
anomalies, since the United States was not a League member.33 Some of these 
American experts attracted money for the League for particular activities. Yet the 
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League’s officers resented this phenomenon, probably because it was perceived as 
an attack on their autonomy. In this sense, Foundation funding was much 
welcomed since it seemed to finance the projects that the League suggested on 
account of their scientific relevance. As Selskar M. Gunn reported, “AS Arthur 
Sweetser refers to the RF methods in highly complimentary manner (sic).” 
During the most critical years for the League, after 1935, US involvement in 
Geneva may have lent legitimacy to the organization. In 1937, Loveday wanted 
the Foundation to fund the hiring of some American experts for the League. The 
Foundation, however, rejected the proposal, reasoning that if the organization 
engaged in contracts between US citizens and the League, it might be interpreted 
as the Foundation taking a political stance in support of US membership in the 
Geneva institution.34 Nevertheless, this was more a question of prudence rather 
than lack of compromise with the League. In fact, many of the Foundation’s 
officers did indeed understand their support for the League as a way to bring the 
United States closer to the international organization: “It would appear that if the 
Trustees were to authorize an appropriation, the terms of which were later to be 
agreed upon in detail with the League authorities, this would both serve as a 
demonstration of American interest and would guarantee the specific programs 
which Loveday has submitted.”35  
The war in Europe made the League’s situation untenable. Many countries were 
abandoning the organization and the League’s budget was in disarray. The fiasco 
of its commitment with collective security made it many within the US 
administration and the liberal internationalist circles to consider that the League 
had to be discarded and that only its technical bodies were worthy of support.36 
On the other hand, Loveday aimed to rescue the Economic and Financial 
Organization of the League by guaranteeing US funding, even if this meant 
moving the organization to the United States. Moreover, since the EFO was 
already working in the design of the new world order after the war it seemed a 
good idea to be located in the country which was destined to shape that world 
order.37 Thus, in 1940, with the Foundation’s support, the League’s technical 
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committees moved to the Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton University. 
To accomplish this move, the Foundation had to overcome Avenol’s resistance 
and obtain approval from the US State Department. The crucial backing of the US 
government was secured, despite the fact that it was an electoral year and that 
voters might interpret the installation of League officials in Princeton as a sign of 
Washington’s involvement in the war. Still, Roosevelt was committed to rescuing 
the League.38 In Princeton, however, the League’s technical bodies were in a weak 
position to develop their own agenda of research. Loveday pursued his ambitious 
plans and asked for Foundation support for developing research on “economic 
depressions,” demographic problems, and commercial policy, among other 
issues. Cut off from Geneva, the Foundation became the technical committee’s 
main source of revenue. The League offices in Princeton seemed to live a 
precarious life. 39  Nevertheless, despite the League’s clear weakness, the 
Foundation continued its support. The justification was again the importance and 
scientific quality of the League’s work: “The standard of the work of the Financial 
and Economic Section, under Mr. Loveday’s leadership, has been at a high level. 
Ten of the most competent members of his staff are now in Princeton.” But it was 
also related to ideas about the postwar world and the need for an international 
organization, under US guidance: “There would appear to be no other group or 
institution so well qualified to review and appraise past experience… and to 
elucidate certain of the lessons of past failures and successes which may be useful 
for future action. The studies proposed are of strategic importance and would be 
carried out in collaboration with many of the leading American specialist in these 
fields.” 40  Even if the League was destined to disappear in the future, the 
Foundation felt obliged to support it in the present: “The Foundation’s role at the 
present time is to tide over the group financially until its absorption by some 
form of postwar international organization.”41 
Since the late 1930s, the League had toyed with the idea of creating a specific 
agency for dealing with economic and technical matters, an idea crystalized in the 
so-called Bruce Report. This was particularly appealing for Foundation officers 
who wished to separate scientific endeavors from “messy” political affairs. This 
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might also have been a way to harness the US government to the League, since 
Roosevelt had already manifested his position in favor of an overhauling of the 
Geneva institutions and separating the political from the technical bodies. In 
1937, “Roosevelt advised Sweetser that the League should abandon its political 
activities, disband its Council and concentrate on the non-political questions 
where it had achieved a degree of success.”42 In fact, the Bruce Committee, the 
League’s effort to reform the institution, was, according to Kathryn Lavelle, “a 
direct response to the letter of Cordell Hull expressing American interest in the 
League’s technical activities.”43 
 For both the US government and the Rockefeller Foundation, the separation of 
the League’s political and technical bodies was a guarantee of an adequate 
working of international organizations in the postwar period, and it anticipated 
the autonomous role of the IMF and the World Bank after World War II. But it 
was also the main consideration of Europeans who wanted to rescue the League 
from the ashes of the war. The League’s directors emphasized that their 
knowledge was indispensable for any future organization of the international 
government.44 The League’s experts had two goals. First, by pursuing the very 
same policies Roosevelt and the US Department of State were recommending, 
namely, to split the technical committees from the political bodies and, and 
second, to replace the tainted Council of the League with a new Central 
Committee. League officials hoped through these two reforms finally to attract 
the open support of the United States: “The Assembly decision to divorce the 
League’s economic and social work of the League from the political side, and to 
substitute the Central Committee for the Council is an event of major 
significance which should ultimately enable nations which will not adhere to the 
political League to collaborate fully in the economic and social work.”45 
Another change the League made during the war was to put all its weight on 
economic and social tasks, believing these to be key for postwar reconstruction. 
This emphasis was also well attuned to New Dealers’ ideas about the future world 
order. In January 1941 Roosevelt gave the famous speech in which he listed 
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“freedom from want” as one of the essential rights of all human beings. League 
experts also, meanwhile, came to view economics as something more complex 
than traditional laissez-faire ideas had allowed. In April 1940, the Australian 
Frank Lidgett McDougall, one of the key figures in the “reinvention” of the 
League, wrote to Joseph Willits, the Director of the Division of Social Science of 
the RF, about which points the Allies should discuss when planning the postwar 
reconstruction. McDougall stressed that they should strive “to secure greater 
equity between all nations in regard to economic opportunities” and “to secure a 
progressive improvement in the welfare of the individual, here including 
standards of living, nutrition, health questions, labor questions, social 
protection.”46  
In many of these emerging fields of research, the League was the leading 
institution: Rockefeller and other foundations, universities, and government were 
following the trail the League was blazing. The new proposals meant, first, that 
the League had to pay attention to areas beyond Europe. This was something 
most liberal internationalist were in agreement on by this time, although it would 
become a source of tension as well. The new proposals also meant that the new 
economic order should pay attention to important social needs, a contentious 
issue. 
The Move to Latin America 
From the founding of the League to the mid- or even late 1930s, its technical 
organizations had focused their attention essentially on Europe. The “Old World” 
had seemed to hold the key to humanity’s political and economic troubles. This 
Eurocentric stance was resented in Latin America. The global depression of the 
1930s and the successive crises of security further strained the relationships 
between Latin America and the League. Many countries in the region abandoned 
an organization they considered to be in decline.47  As part of its process of 
transformation in the 1930s and 1940s, the League tried to recover the trust of 
the Latin American countries by increasing its activity in the region. 
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The United States government also turned its attention toward Latin America in 
the 1930s, as its strategy was becoming increasingly global. The first step was to 
redefine its relationships with Latin American countries. This had already begun 
under the Hoover administration and became more urgent as the possibility of 
war in Europe became more likely. Roosevelt’s administration showed particular 
sensitivity to Latin American interests in an approach called the Good Neighbor 
Policy. These new geopolitical circumstances interacted with the activities of the 
League of Nations and the Rockefeller Foundation. The US government wanted 
to preserve the League as a pivotal organization in the global architecture of the 
future.48 
The Rockefeller Foundation had collaborated with Latin America governments 
and the League of Nations since the 1920s. In some cases, as in other domains, 
the interests and purposes of the Foundation’s projects for Latin America and the 
League’s plans for the region overlapped. These convergences, however, were 
fraught with complexities and tensions. In the 1920s, the League’s Health 
Organization increased the attention it paid to Latin American countries at a 
moment when some of them were threatening to abandon the international body. 
In order to gain the sympathies of Latin Americans, the League Health 
Organization several missions sent to the Americas with the financial support of 
the Rockefeller Foundation's International Health Department (IHD). The IHD 
also backed a program of doctor exchanges that the League had proposed. The 
IHD not only provided funding, it also played a major role in organizing the 
logistics of the projects. The Department had a long tradition of involvement in 
the health policies of Latin America; it had contributed to the creation of national 
health systems in several countries of the region. The convergence of interests 
between the League and the Foundation, however, concealed some tensions. The 
main focus of the IHD was on fighting epidemics, whereas the League’s Health 
Organization had developed a wider idea about health that included economic 
and social policies.49  
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Traditionally, public health was the Foundation’s main area of interest in Latin 
America. In 1938 alone, the IHD spent $400,000 dollars in Latin America—one 
fifth of its total budget.50 In the late 1930s, however, the Foundation felt an acute 
obligation to broaden its activities in the region. The geopolitical needs of the US 
government were the clear drive behind this move. In 1937, Foundation officers 
grew intensely interested in enlarging their program of social science in Latin 
America. In December 1937, an internal Foundation memo entitled “An RF 
program for Latin America” stated the reasons for the need of a specific program 
devoted to the region. The most important were the increased sympathy of Latin 
Americans toward the United States due to the carrying out of the Good Neighbor 
Policy, the interests of the US government in Latin America’s raw material as has 
been expressed by President Roosevelt himself and finally the threat of 
“economic and cultural penetration by fascist countries.”51 Therefore, for some 
officers of the Foundation, in particular Sydnor H. Walker, the strategic needs of 
the US Administration and the “conditions” in Asia and Europe imposed greater 
involvement of the Foundation in Latin America.52 
In 1938, the US government began applying significant pressure on the 
Foundation. The State Department sought the Foundation’s cooperation in its 
new policy toward Latin America when the possibility of war in Europe 
increased.53 The US administration wanted to preserve the good will of the Latin 
American republics since it assumed that Latin American raw materials would be 
essential if the United States became involved in a war. Secretary of Agriculture 
Henry Wallace was particularly insistent; in letters to and conversations with 
Foundation representatives he repeatedly asked the organization to support the 
government by extending its programs in Latin America, in the hope that those 
programs would stimulate the transformation of Latin American agriculture and 
make it more productive, thereby guaranteeing the supply of a “variety of 
essential materials that we could not produce for ourselves.” A further goal was to 
encourage trade relationships between the United States and Latin America as a 
way to shore up the region’s democratic regimes against the fascist threat.54 
 
18 R A C  R E S E A R C H  R E P O R T S  
The pressure from Washington continued until the end of the war, but the 
Foundation remained hesitant to follow the government’s line. Given that the 
Foundation had already been active in Latin America for a long time, it cannot be 
assumed that the organization was not interested in the region. Rather, other 
obstacles stood in the way of its expansion there. First, there was the risk of 
overreach. The Foundation could not act in every single domain. As one 
Foundation report put it, “Limitation of Foundation interest is considered 
necessary.”55 Second, new activities in the field of social sciences in Latin America 
provoked tugs-of-war with the IHD, which aspired to a dominant position in the 
region.56 Third, and most important, the Foundation’s officers were concerned 
about the possibilities of obtaining adequate results in the field of social sciences 
in Latin America due to the scarcity of well-prepared researchers in the region.57  
Unlike in the field of health, where it was possible to obtain concrete results, 
expectations were low in the social sciences. In 1941, Frank Fetter, an orthodox 
economist influenced by the School of Vienna, wrote a report for the Foundation 
about the possibility of investing in the study of economics in Latin America. His 
conclusions were blatantly negative: “South Americans have a failing for planning 
things on a grandiose scale, particularly if someone else is putting up the money. 
As I see it, it would be a waste of money to set up research institutes along 
American lines.” 58  But again, these scientific reasons were closely linked to 
political positions.  
The Foundation decided to adopt a cautious attitude toward Latin America and 
increase its activities only moderately. It would focus on two areas: social security 
and public administration.59 The first was a program developed in agreement 
with the League (see below). The second demonstrated that the Foundation 
aimed to use the social sciences as a way to introduce a technocratic approach 
into the Latin American governments rather than directly shifting the content of 
economic policy in the continent. The choice of Frank Fetter is highly suggestive 
in this regard. Wallace, moreover—now the vice president of the United States—
made it clear that the Foundation’s activities should go beyond what the IHD had 
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accomplished in the past: “RBF and JAF have talked with Wallace, who sees work 
primarily in fields of health, broader than that now under way, and in agriculture 
. . . Program of health by itself not connected with anything to raise the standard 
of living would result in depressing the standard of living—health by itself not 
enough—must be supported by agricultural economics.”60  
Wallace pushed the Foundation to go beyond its traditional health policies in 
Latin America, toward a posture that converged with the more holistic approach 
to health and economic issues defended by the League. These demands stirred 
controversy and anxiety within the Foundation, revealing a major divergence in 
the liberal international coalition about the meaning of the new policies. The 
geographer Carl Sauer, who was sent on a mission to Mexico, was particularly 
critical: “Under Mr. Wallace’s administration the USDA has developed an 
aggressive political philosophy of the good life to our Latin neighbors . . . I like a 
fair share of their program, but I think it is necessary to be quite clear that the 
USDA is primarily a political organization today. Loyalty to the organization is a 
cardinal virtue; criticism of the best sort if likely to be considered as lack of 
cooperation.” 61  Although to denounce the Department of Agriculture as an 
aggressive political body might have been idiosyncratic to Sauer, Foundation 
officers were not far from that position. The tensions with Wallace continued well 
into the war. In 1944, Vice President Wallace asked for the Foundation’s support 
in the search for students and the establishment of a program of fellowships for 
an Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Science in Costa Rica under the 
supervision of the Pan American Union. The Foundation did not agree to finance 
the project because it did not consider it scientifically sound.62 The Foundation 
had to defend itself against accusations that it was not involved enough in Latin 
America: “The SS policy of low priority for Latin America is being questioned by 
so many thoughtful persons that call for re-analysis.” In its “re-analysis,” the 
Foundation presciently argued that it needed to pay special attention to Europe 
“because RF cannot ‘sing off’ in the attempt to restore the intellectual life of 
Europe after the war” and Asia “because Asia will, much more than in the past, be 
the center of gravity of population, markets, social changes, and of influence for 
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peace or war.” In any event, according to its own narrative, the Foundation was 
assuming the hard work and avoiding taking decisions on political grounds: “The 
United States Government and many other agencies have been pouring attention 
on Latin America, and political considerations will probably mean a continuance 
of this policy though with a reduced emphasis. We in [the Division of Social 
Sciences] have assumed that the unpopular role was the right one (sic) for us.”63 
The existence of these tensions did not mean that the liberal internationalist 
coalition ceased to function. With the outbreak of the Second World War, the US 
government took the initiative in its cooperation with Latin America. In addition 
to the activities of the Department of Agriculture or the Department of State, in 
August 1940 Washington created the Office for Coordination of Commercial and 
Cultural Relations between the American Republics (also known as Office of the 
Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs). Nelson A. Rockefeller, whose business 
interests in Latin America had given him extensive knowledge of the region, was 
appointed Coordinator.64 The Office of the Coordinator gathered resources from 
the US government that the Foundation could not match, including significant 
loans for Latin American countries from the Export-Import Bank. The Office 
worked to obtain raw materials that the United States needed for its war effort 
through commerce and cooperation with the Latin American republics. But this 
also meant paying attention to Latin American needs, including the recognition 
of the emergence of an industrial sector that should be encouraged. In fact, 
Nelson Rockefeller devoted a good deal of his time as Coordinator to persuading 
the US business sector that the industrialization of Latin America was not 
detrimental to its interests.65 In this way, the Office took a development-oriented 
stance that, as the historiography has argued, would be the dominant view of the 
US administration and of international organizations after the war, a track that 
the Rockefeller Foundation had opened. Of course, its chairman was a 
Rockefeller. It also worked with businessmen via the US Chamber of Commerce. 
The activities of the Office overlapped with those that the Foundation had 
traditionally carried out in South America, mostly in the field of public health. 
But its activities went beyond that: the Office involved itself in a wide gamut of 
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development enterprises, which emulated the new orientations of the League’s 
technical committees.66 Nevertheless, the appointment of Nelson Rockefeller to 
the Office meant that he could take advantage of the Foundation’s experience and 
logistical support, in particular from the IHD. Thus, some experts of the IHD 
cooperated and advised the Office of the Coordinator in its work in Latin 
America. 67  The cooperation between the Office of the Coordinator and the 
Foundation contrasts with the clashes of the Foundation with other sectors of the 
US administration. 
The Office, being an inter-departmental agency, became involved in a conflict 
with the Department of State and the Department of Agriculture over their actual 
prerogatives in some specific projects in Latin American countries, such as food 
and nutrition programs. In the end the Department of State prevailed, 
demonstrating that geopolitical considerations were the ultimate rationale for 
policy toward the Americas. 68  Ultimately, the Office was replaced by a new 
Council for Inter-American Cooperation in September 1944, organized as a 
corporation and controlled by private interests.69  
Convergences and Divergences within the Coalition: The Cases of the 
Fiscal Committee and the ILO 
Like the US government, the beleaguered League of Nations attempted to regain 
its legitimacy in Latin America in the 1930 and 1940s. In this move, the 
Foundation’s support was crucial, but at the same time it stirred important 
tensions in the relationship between the Foundation and the League. The 
movement to Latin America was also mediated by the actions of the US 
administration. The convergences and tensions between the League and the 
Foundation were reflected, among others, in the cases of the activities of the 
Fiscal Committee and in the expansive role of the International Labor Office in 
Latin America since the 1930s. 
The Fiscal Committee of the League of Nations was created in 1928 to replace a 
former Committee on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, which dealt with 
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international taxation issues. The Fiscal Committee studied—among other 
concerns—problems related to the taxation of companies active in more than one 
country, such as multinational corporations. The Rockefeller Foundation made 
its first grant, of $90,000, to the Committee in 1930.70  A close and lasting 
relationship between the Foundation, some US universities, and the Fiscal 
Committee was emerging at this time.71 One important figure in this relationships 
was Thomas S. Adams, from Yale University. Like Condliffe, Adams was another 
example of scholars playing an intermediary role between the League and the 
Foundation. But the Foundation’s history with the Fiscal Committee is also a 
good example of the Foundation’s intimate relationship with US government and 
private interests in general. In 1918, Adams was economic advisor to the US 
Treasury Department and under his influence—and responding to the pressure 
from the business sector—the government accepted the principle that an 
American company carrying out activities on foreign soil should pay taxes first in 
the foreign country. In turn, the Treasury would offer tax credits on the domestic 
income tax equivalent to the amounts paid abroad.72 The Committee on Double 
Taxation had contemplated this same principle in the 1920s.  
One of the novelties of the Fiscal Committee in the 1930s was a renewed 
commitment to its goals on the part of some sectors of the US elite. Washington 
had been consistently sending representatives to the various committees on 
taxation since at least 1926.73 In the 1930s, however, particular individuals and 
organizations silently worked to anchor the activities of the Committee to US 
realities. The US Chamber of Commerce and the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) were particularly interested in shaping domestic tax policies 
and also in regulating the international taxation of corporations (the question of 
apportionment of income in tax agreements between two countries). The US 
Chamber believed that American participation in the Fiscal Committee might 
offer an opportunity to deal with both issues, to shape to some extent the very 
agenda of the Fiscal Committee. Adams, who seemed to act as a speaker for the 
Chamber, tried to guide the League’s decisions through the allocation of 
Foundation funds:  
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The use of the grant if made—i.e., the selection of the problem to be 
investigated—should be and may safely be left to the Fiscal Committee itself. 
However, it would be wise to stipulate or to suggest that it be applied in the first 
instance to the problem noted above and that a portion not to exceed $15,000 be 
devoted to the investigation of this question in the United States. The problem 
exists in an acute form in American State income taxation, and American 
experience is particularly significant.74  
To be effective, official US representatives should attend the sessions of the Fiscal 
Committee—not an easy process since the United States was not a member of the 
League: “You have probably received by this time from the United States 
Chamber of Commerce a transcript of the Conference held at Washington 
February 14th, 1930 . . . The purpose of the conference was . . . to obtain critical 
suggestions about the best basis of domestic legislation to enable the United 
States to participate in the international movement to reduce double taxation.”75 
Again, the Foundation—on this occasion in cooperation with the Chamber of 
Commerce—tried to shape US domestic policies by harnessing the United States 
to an international organization. 
The exploration of international taxation issues was particularly appealing to US 
interests and the Foundation had to insist on its support for this activity within 
the League. Loveday, the Director of the Financial Section, had “reservations” 
that were linked to the ear-marked features of the Foundation’s grant. Loveday 
preferred to use Foundation’s funds in a more flexible way for the projects he 
considered important. Obviously, the study of international taxation was 
becoming more and more attuned to US and private interests, such as those of 
the ICC. In March 1933, the Foundation recommended that the ICC invite the 
Fiscal Committee of the League to participate in a meeting in Geneva organized 
by Adams because, as the telegram put it, it was “highly desirable to establish 
friendly cooperation of American enterprises and taxation authorities with fiscal 
committee.”76 As Adams recognized, “The problem of allocation is probably more 
acute and important in the United States than elsewhere.”77 That is, the problem 
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of deciding how to calculate the taxable benefits of big corporations working in 
different countries was more pressing for the United States because of the sheer 
number of American big corporations. The connections between the Fiscal 
Committee and the United States became apparent when in March 1933 the 
Fiscal Committee worked in New York and Washington, becoming the first body 
of the League to hold sessions in the United States. Foundation monies made it 
possible for the Fiscal Committee to travel to the United States, where the 
League’s experts “listened with an open mind to suggestions made by American 
business men.”78 
After Adams, the key figure in the entanglement of interests among the US 
government, the Chamber(s) of Commerce and the Fiscal Committee was 
Mitchell B. Carroll. The US Department of Commerce had appointed this lawyer, 
a tax expert, as the American representative to the Fiscal Committee of the 
League. Carroll was knowledgeable in European as well as American affairs and 
maintained close connections with the International Chamber of Commerce. He 
became a key figure in international tax law and founded the International Fiscal 
Association in 1938. 79  Carroll typified a usual practice of American 
internationalism in the interwar period, moving in the grey area between public 
and private interests. Carroll conceived his projects as being for both Europe and 
Latin America, which gave him a rare wide perspective on international 
economics. Moreover, his defense of multilateralism was the reflection of strong 
personal conviction, and at the same time the result of his experience within the 
League of Nations Fiscal Committee and his links with the International 
Chamber of Commerce and the most internationalized US businessmen.  
In 1930, Carroll was in charge of the League’s studies on double taxation. His 
salary, over $54,000 annually, consumed more than half of the Foundation’s 
grant for the Fiscal Committee.80 Adams died in 1933, leaving Carroll as the 
Foundation’s main interlocutor in the field. As of the early 1930s, private 
interests seemed to be the leading voice in the international discussions about 
taxation. As Van Sickle put it in 1934, “It is apparent that influential groups in all 
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principal countries have rallied behind the League proposal and there are real 
possibilities of final success.”81 Beginning in the late 1930s, however, the agenda 
of the Fiscal Committee and the US government diverged from the main interests 
of the Chamber of Commerce and the Fiscal Committee began a different phase 
in its history.  
A number of factors brought about this change. First, the League’s political crisis 
affected the working of the Fiscal Committee. Loveday’s doubts about a project 
that seemed to fit US needs too closely have already been mentioned. In 1936, 
these doubts were reflected in strains between Loveday and Carroll. 82 
Furthermore, these tensions coincided with Avenol’s reluctance to open the 
League to US influence. 83  Nevertheless, Rockefeller Foundation funding was 
extremely important for the League and it could not be easily dismissed. In 1936, 
Loveday asked for an extension of the grant for the study on double taxation. At 
first, taking into account the political crisis of the League that eroded its 
legitimacy and Avenol’s erratic attitudes, Foundation officers hesitated to 
continue the support. Paradoxically, however, the fact that Avenol was distancing 
himself from liberal internationalists persuaded the officers that they should 
convince the trustees of the importance of the proposal on double taxation: “Our 
change of attitude is due to the information contained in your excellent report of 
Avenol’s loathness to receive aid from outside organizations. We now think it 
might complicate matters unduly if we failed to cooperate at this particular 
time.” 84  Hence, the Foundation’s continued backing for research on double 
taxation was about more than the intrinsic importance of taxation issues. It was 
also meant to maintain the League in the liberal internationalist orbit. 
Second, the Fiscal Committee shifted its interests in parallel with the 
transformation of the League. Latin America gained in importance, converging 
with the United States’ geostrategic priorities. From 1937, the League’s Fiscal 
Committee began sending a series of letters to Latin American governments to 
canvass their potential interest in participating in a global agreement on 
international tax regulation, in particular regarding tax evasion and the taxing of 
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movable capital profits.85 In 1939, Carroll asked for a new Foundation grant for 
the Fiscal Committee. The Foundation responded that a renewal of the support 
for the research on double taxation could not be considered, as was stated in the 
grant agreement of 1936. Nevertheless, the Foundation floated the possibility of 
funding new research projects at a time when the Fiscal Committee itself was 
considering the possibility of beginning a program aimed at advising Latin 
American countries on their tax reform plans.86 Last but not least, the move to 
Princeton, supported by the Department of State and President Roosevelt 
himself, was also a way to reinforce the League’s Latin American agenda. From 
their base in the United States, the League’s technical committees, including the 
Fiscal Committee, established a stronger level of cooperation with some sectors 
of the US government.87 
But the Fiscal Committee’s new interest in Latin America also related to the 
strategy of several Latin American governments. As the industrial sector 
advanced in some of the largest republics in the continent, including Mexico, 
Brazil, and Argentina, their governments sought to refurbish their fiscal systems, 
introducing the income tax and other direct tax devices and lessening their 
dependency on unstable taxes on foreign trade. Moreover, as a result of increased 
urbanization, the rise of middle classes, and the mobilization of popular sectors, 
the largest Latin American republics sought to introduce more equitable taxes.88 
Latin American politicians therefore looked to the League’s expertise as a source 
of valuable know-how for carrying out their domestic reforms. Mexican 
representatives at the League seemed to act “as the spokesman for other South 
American delegations” in requesting from the Fiscal Committee a special project 
to study their tax systems.89 
As a result of the new cooperation between the Fiscal Committee and the Latin 
American governments, two fiscal conferences were held in Mexico City, in 1940 
and 1943, respectively. The Fiscal Committee’s goal for these meetings was to 
pursue the original programs on double taxation begun in Europe in the 1920s. 
Latin American representatives at these conferences, however, transformed the 
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discussion. Unlike what had happened in the European countries in the past, the 
model agreements on double taxation elaborated in particular in the second 
Mexican conference tilted in favor of capital-importing countries. Furthermore, 
the discussion evolved from debates about double taxation and taxation of 
multinational corporations to an exchange about the definition of development 
issues. Thus, in the 1943 conference, the largest Latin American republics created 
a Sub-Committee IV on general fiscal problems that went beyond mere fiscal 
issues. “Taxation,” the conference text stipulated, “was to be geared as to improve 
the distribution of wealth, and at the same time, not inhibit individual initiative . . 
. tax problems of the day could not be dissociated from a consideration from long 
social and economic objectives.”90 
The League’s Fiscal Committee had been assessing the possibility of establishing 
a special program for Latin America since before it moved to Princeton. The 
Committee even considered the option of creating a “small secretariat” in Latin 
America.91 As it had with the question of expanding its social sciences programs 
in the region, however, the Foundation also had serious doubts about supporting 
this move. Tracy Kittredge warned Loveday that the financial support for the 
Fiscal Committee depended on him eliminating “from his program . . . any 
special Latin American project” and “it seems inadvisable for the New York office 
of the Foundation to provide further funds at this time for any program of the 
Fiscal Committee specifically related to the special problems.” And yet, the funds 
were provided. The first Mexican fiscal conference of 1940 was partly funded with 
monies from the Rockefeller grant to the Fiscal Committee of 1939.92  
The Foundation’s halfhearted support for the Fiscal Committee might be related 
to its fear of overstretching and its reluctance to enlarge its activities in Latin 
America. Nevertheless, it did, in fact, lend its support. Why? The willingness of 
the US administration to cooperate with the League’s efforts in this field is the 
main reason behind this move. Carroll, acting as the official US representative, 
register the opinion that Latin America “should be put in the forefront.”93 The US 
government was interested in deepening its commercial and economic links with 
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Latin America. The growth of US investment in the region also meant that US 
authorities and businessmen had a particular interest in signing taxation 
agreements with Latin American states. The role of the Fiscal Committee was 
therefore likely crucial. The League provided apparently neutral scientific models 
for international tax agreements that to a large extent reflected US influence. 
Eldon King, from the Internal Revenue Service, put it in a straightforward way: “a 
great deal of educational work must be done and… this could be accomplished 
best by a series of meetings of the Fiscal Committee in Latin America which 
would be attended by the members and corresponding members of the various 
Latin American countries.”94 Just as the Foundation tried to shape US domestic 
policies by linking the authorities in Washington to an international organization, 
the US authorities likewise tried to discipline Latin American governments 
through an international organization. 
Washington backed the Fiscal Committee experiments in Latin America (and 
therefore the Foundation’s presence) for another reason, as well: Latin 
Americans’ development proposals fit nicely into an ambitious US program of 
reconstruction that went beyond mere fiscal policies. Beginning in late 1942 and 
early 1943, the Allies grew more optimistic about the war effort against the Axis 
and plans for reorganizing the world economic order after the war gained 
momentum. “As part of the postwar program” a second conference on taxation 
was called by the League.95 Latin Americans who participated could therefore 
make a significant contribution to the shaping of the new model of international 
development heralded by the United States for the postwar period. This model, 
sometimes called “embedded liberalism,” blended international free trade with 
domestic interventionism, and was an essential part of Roosevelt’s Good 
Neighbor Policy.96  
Ultimately, without its involvement in Latin America, the League’s technical 
committees, and in particular the Fiscal Committee, would have appeared to be 
completely inactive at its new site in Princeton. If the Foundation had decided to 
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put its weight behind the League, it would have had to accept the League’s Latin 
American orientation. 
Convergences were also divergences; international liberalism had many faces. 
The Foundation’s support for the Geneva institution does not mean that there 
was a blind confidence. Probably the clearest example of this was the program of 
social insurance for Latin America promoted by the International Labor Office 
(ILO). In theory, the ILO was part of the structure of the League of Nations. 
However, the place of the ILO within the League was complex and the ILO 
maintained a high degree of autonomy. Any country that joined the League would 
automatically become a member of the ILO, but this was not true the other way 
around: a nation could become a member of the ILO without joining the League. 
This was precisely the case of the United States, which became member of the 
ILO in 1934. 
The Foundation’s relationships with the ILO, from an early date, were strained. 
Foundation officers believed the ILO, like the League of Nations itself, might be a 
useful tool for advancing important research projects in the field of labor and 
industry. In fact, the Foundation wanted the ILO to be transformed into a 
research center. As usual, the Foundation’s goal was more than scientific 
curiosity. Joseph Willits, for example, hoped that the ILO might become a “pulpit 
from which to stimulate the extension of collaborative experiments in industry.”97 
In this, the aims of the Foundation and those of the ILO converged. But there 
were also obstacles in the way of a fruitful cooperation between the two bodies. In 
1927, Willits asserted that the ILO was under the strict control of French socialist 
Albert Thomas, who considered any cooperation with the American foundation to 
be “politically dangerous.”98 Willets’s criticism of Thomas was based on scientific 
criteria. Professional economists linked to the Foundation, such as the Swede 
Bertil Ohlin, accused Thomas of selecting inadequate personnel—“favorites,” 
without “personal competence”—to work on research projects the ILO was 
carrying out, including a comparison of international costs of living or statistics 
about wages.99 Nevertheless, Foundation officers expressed contradictory views 
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about the ILO’s scientific competence. Among other examples, in 1937, a 
Foundation memo stated: “The International Labor Office has unique experience 
and materials relating to the problems to be studied. It has built up, over a period 
of years, a staff of competent experts. The Economic Section . . . includes a 
number of able young economists, five of whom held Foundation fellowships.”100 
Such conflicting statements suggest that the differences between the ILO and the 
Foundation went beyond issues of knowledge and expertise. 
After the global economic meltdown of the 1930s, the ILO became more 
concerned with economic research and this stimulated its interest in working 
with the Foundation. In 1936, Harold Butler, then director of the ILO, hesitantly 
opened negotiations with the Foundation regarding funding. Butler’s hesitation 
emerged out of a divergent conception of the study of social problems. According 
to Tracy Kittredge, the Foundation officer who negotiated with the ILO, “Butler 
apparently wished to avoid any merely economic study of such problems, for 
example, as shortening hours of labor, the increase of social insurance benefits, 
etc.”—while the Foundation sought to keep the scope of economic studies 
narrow.101 This divergence of philosophy overshadowed Rockefeller-ILO relations 
through the following decade. 
In contrast to Butler’s hesitation, the Foundation seemed committed to financing 
an ILO research project on the impact of national economic policies on standards 
of living, wages, and the economic security of the working classes. Behind the 
scientific discourse, an attempt to curb labor demands emerged. Edmund Day 
expressed it clearly: “he Day would like to see how far an organization with a 
frankly labor mandate and labor backing was able to push disinterested appraisal 
or national policies . . . this procedure would teach labor interests to stand back 
and analyze situations which they were trying to remedy.”102  
Despite the Foundation’s interest, the ILO ultimately withdrew its request for 
funding. The reasons varied, but Day’s statement played a role here. Apparently, 
European labor representatives suspected that Rockefeller Foundation money 
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“stood for the defense of capitalism.” But the attitude of American labor delegates 
was more important than the European position. According to Kittredge, Butler 
changed his mind toward the Foundation after American labor union pressure 
resulted in the United States joining the ILO.103 US labor resented the possible 
influence of Foundation funding and Butler heeded their position: “American 
participation in the ILO was Butler’s ‘baby’ and that he was desperately afraid 
that anything which alienated American labor might lead to American 
withdrawal.” 104  The ILO was therefore the site of a subtle domestic conflict 
between the US labor movement and the Foundation at a time when the New 
Deal was expanding workers’ rights. American support for the ILO was not, 
moreover, a minor point. As a member nation, the United States contributed 
significantly to the ILO’s budget.  
Some officers at the ILO, on the other hand, fretted about possible Rockefeller 
Foundation interference in the policies advocated by the international institution. 
Edmund Day’s words sounded truly threatening: “Butler has quoted EED’s 
remark . . . that the Labor Office project for economic studies was welcomed by 
the RF because it might teach Labor a few useful lessons about the economic 
impossibility of parts of their social policy program.”105 
Another factor involved was Butler’s fear of pressure from the fascist powers that 
were subject to ILO criticism. 106  This helps to explain why the Foundation 
continued to support the ILO, despite their differences. As with the League of 
Nations as a whole, the Foundation decided to shore up the organization as part 
of its general response to the international political crisis. And as it had done for 
the League’s technical committees, the international crisis led the ILO to increase 
its interest in Latin America. In part, this was a reaction to the creation of a labor 
office within the Pan-American Union.107 It was also, in part, a response, as it had 
been for the Fiscal Committee, to demands from Latin Americans, who called for 
the introduction of new systems of social security in their countries and who 
hoped to learn from the ILO’s European experience and knowledge.108 
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The ILO needed Foundation support to accomplish its program of study and of 
advising Latin American governments about social security issues. Foundation 
funding might have been perceived as indirect American backing for the ILO’s 
programs and would therefore minimize the threat of a rival Pan-American social 
security project. Rockefeller aid was also essential for carrying out the project. In 
1937, ILO official Adrien Tixier contacted the Foundation to explore the 
possibilities for future cooperation, in particular regarding funding for Latin 
American experts and politicians to travel to Geneva and other cities to receive 
training in the field of social security. The conversations between Tixier and 
Rockefeller Foundation officer Sydnor Walker revealed the differences between 
the organizations. Tixier remarked that “the foundations, not only the Rockefeller 
but others, had mental reservations about the type of work to which the ILO is 
pledged, that is, accomplishment of social progress through legislation and public 
programs” and explicitly criticized Rockefeller Foundation health policies for 
using a “voluntary or charitable organization in order to accomplish social 
change— Tixier indicated that we were working with the background of a 
different philosophy from that of the ILO.” In her response, Walker recognized 
that many trustees of the Foundation had suspicious feelings about “the 
desirability of social legislation and public action in regard to an increasing area 
of life.” Nonetheless, Walker felt confident that the Foundation might support the 
ILO’s proposal for Latin America, since they were interested in “satisfactory 
administration of social legislation.” 109  Therefore, Walker hope to transform 
social policies into social administration, and therefore tone down some of its 
more threatening features. 
The tensions between the Foundation and the ILO regarding the social security 
program were already established and would persist until the end of World War 
II. In fact, Walker was probably the most sympathetic officer within the 
Foundation toward the proposal of the ILO, perhaps because of her experience in 
the field of social policy. Part of the problems were related to the growth of 
activities in Latin America and the possible conflicts with the Foundation’s own 
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IHD. Walker proposed a collaboration with Latin American social security 
officials as part of the new social science programs for the region that she 
advocated. It is revealing that she emphasized that this was a field in which Latin 
American themselves wished to invest their efforts. Yet, Raymond Fosdick 
recommended first approaching the IHD.110 Although it did not fund a specific 
ILO program for Latin America, the Foundation did begin financing ILO 
activities in the field of social security. In 1938, the Foundation paid for Edgardo 
Rebagliati, Director of the Peruvian Social Insurance Fund to travel to Geneva to 
visit ILO headquarters along with several European countries and the United 
States in order to learn from these countries’ experiences with social insurance. 
To avoid any misunderstanding with Washington, the Foundation reported this 
trip to the US State Department.111 
Despite this rapprochement, the suspicions about the ILO’s projects persisted 
and forced the Foundation to struggle with permanent contradictions. To some 
extent its support for Roosevelt’s liberal internationalist policies clashed with the 
interests of some of the trustees and even with some members of the Rockefeller 
family themselves. In 1939, Nelson Rockefeller made a business trip to Venezuela 
to care for the interests of the Creole Petroleum Corporation, a subsidiary of 
Standard Oil, the Rockefellers’ flagship. Before his trip, several Standard Oil 
executives prepared a report on conditions in Venezuela. The report warned of 
the “danger of unions becoming strong political organizations,” using the 
Mexican case as an example of excessive labor power. It also reported that with 
the help of three “experts” (sic) from the League of Nations, the Venezuelan 
government had been drafting a new labor code and social security law. Although 
the law had not been enacted, the reporter expressed deep fears about this 
possibility: “This draft is extremely dangerous, calling for contributions from 
employers and to a lesser extent from employees to build up a fund which the 
Government would administer for taking care of all cases of sickness and 
accidents . . . the payment of partial or full time pensions as a result of such 
accidents and sickness.”112 Of course, the report transmitted the Standard Oil 
Company’s concerns about its investments in Venezuela. But it might be  also 
 
34 R A C  R E S E A R C H  R E P O R T S  
understood as an indirect allusion to the controversial Social Security Act 
introduced by Roosevelt in the United States in 1935. The idea that social security 
payments were to be financed by contributions from the employers was a 
“dangerous” one either in Venezuela or in the United States. In any event, Nelson 
Rockefeller himself—though in his capacity as director of the Inter-American 
Office—financed the 1942 Conference of Latin American States on social security 
problems, in which the ILO played a significant role.113 What had changed was 
that the United States had entered World War II.  
The crisis of the League also affected the ILO. League funding was slashed and 
the ILO was forced to rely on American contributions more than ever.114 In its 
own process of reinvention, the ILO drew closer to Latin America. As had 
happened with the larger League, Latin American demands and the deepening of 
industrialization in the region were behind this shift.115 But geopolitical reasons 
were even more important. In 1940, the ILO moved its headquarters to the 
American continent. The Labor Office officers’ first choice was Washington. But 
this was not a politically palatable option for many US politicians and notables. 
The Foundation itself gave the idea a lukewarm reception. The ILO ultimately 
settled on Montreal. Once in Montreal, the ILO became closer to Latin America. 
The internal controversies over financing the ILO became acute during the 
organization’s Canadian sojourn. Kittredge and especially Willits were adamant 
opposed to collaborating with the Labor Office. Willits argued that there was a 
sort of implicit agreement between the Carnegie and Rockefeller foundations: the 
former was in charge of financing the ILO, while the latter took care of the 
economic section of the League.116 It is true that the ILO traditionally received 
larger sums from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace but this had 
not prevented the Rockefeller Foundation from funding the Labor Office in the 
past. The most common arguments, however, were the usual ones, those that 
challenged the scientific competence of the ILO to carry out its research projects 
or questioned the logistics of expanding Foundation involvement in Latin 
America. Willits proposed a general assessment of the institution before 
R A C  R E S E A R C H  R E P O R T S  35 
 
committing the Foundation to further support: “What is the degree of 
competence from the point of view of research? What are its limitations? For 
what type of work is it competent?”117  
Of course, political motives also played a major part in this conflict. Willits 
considered that the proposal of the ILO “was not convincing in itself,” 
considering that it was going to be used to “promote social insurance in Latin 
America and to codify labor legislation.”118 Not everyone shared Willits’s hostile 
attitude toward the Labor Office. Raymond Fosdick, for one, wondered whether 
“we are on sure ground in taking a negative position in relation to the ILO.” The 
reason was that the ILO, like the League, was “one of the agencies whose research 
seems to have a real and vital meaning in terms of the kind of world we are going 
to live in after the war.”119 Indeed, this was precisely the key issue. Beyond an 
apparent consensus on the world in which they wanted to live after the war, 
major disagreements remained within the international liberal coalition and its 
allies (such as some Latin American governments). The discomfort of some 
trustees with the study of social policies has already been mentioned. In 1943, the 
Foundation helped to organize a visit by British economist William Beveridge to 
the United States. Beveridge reached notoriety as the creator of a report on social 
security that would became the blueprint for the construction of the welfare state 
in Britain after the war. On the occasion of Beveridge’s visit, a Foundation 
trustees, Eli Whitney Debevoise, wrote Fosdick complaining about Beveridge 
proposals. An officer of the Foundation summarized Debevoise ideas: “freedom 
from want which D. does not think is according to the American way life,” and 
“D. fears that the Beveridge plan is not a good idea for the U.S. He thinks it may 
have disastrous results.”120 
The Foundation’s cooperation with the League’s technical committee and the 
ILO—even after the beginning of the war in Europe—was based on a common 
expectation of contributing to shaping the future international economic order. 
Both institutions, and the US government as well, shared ideas about what 
economic recovery and development should look like after the conflict. Liberal 
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internationalists in the United States and in Europe believed economic security 
was fundamental to global peace and stability. This converged with the Atlantic 
Charter and Roosevelt’s speech about freedom from wants. Yet visions of 
development among these actors could also diverge. As early as 1938, the ILO’s 
Lewis L. Lorwin wrote to James T. Shotwell of the Carnegie Peace Endowment 
with a thorough project of international organization. Lorwin, following US ideas 
about separating the economic and social bodies of the League from the Council, 
proposed to establish a World Economic Development Organization. The new 
organization would promote “economic development in different parts of the 
world with a view to raising the standards of living of the masses.” Lorwin’s 
document paid special attention to the future Third World, which he referred as 
“to-be-developed countries.” Development, he argued, could not be based on “the 
old forms of international lending.” Nor was international trade any guarantee of 
peace and stability. An international economic organization should take into 
account the “best economic and social interest of the people of both the 
developed and to-be-developed countries.”121 This proposal highlights the extent 
to which ideas about the role of international organizations evolved in the 1930s 
and also the extent of differences among the very actors who defended the need 
for these international organizations. In 1942, Foundation officers reflected on 
these transformations with some perplexity about the contentious meaning of 
words, asking, “Does the ‘well-being of mankind throughout the world’ take on a 
different form and definition than it did a decade ago when we conceived our 
objectives in terms primarily of the extension of knowledge?” 122  Liberal 
internationalism clearly had many faces, and in the postwar era the World Bank 
and the IMF had to allow some room for the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council, as well as for the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean. 
Conclusion: What Are International Organizations Good For? 
In 1946, at the moment of the League’s dissolution, the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
Joseph Willits asked Henry Luce, publisher of Time, Life, and Fortune 
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magazines, to dedicate some attention in his publications to the history of an 
institution that had played a major role in combatting nationalism. 123  The 
historiography of the League of Nations has devoted hundreds of pages to the 
issue of its failure or its relative and short-lived successes. Yet, in a period of 
economic collapse, ideological extremism, and total war, what is most striking is 
the League’s capacity to survive. The Rockefeller Foundation’s (and the US 
government’s) support for its activities were key to that survival. In the 1940s, to 
some extent, the Geneva institutions became American institutions. Beginning in 
the late 1930s, both the League and the International Labor Office recovered 
their positions in Latin America, regaining legitimacy and, most importantly, 
connecting many Latin Americans experts and politicians with a future 
international organization.124  
Without these American pillars, the League would not have survived until 1946. 
Why did the Foundation help the League to weather the storm? Willits’s letter to 
Luce suggested that the League was a weapon of war. In fact, even before the 
United States entry into the war, the Foundation had the discussion of the future 
global order in mind. That discussion was part of debates that took place among 
the Allies during the war and it helped to cement a coalition of liberal 
internationalists in the Americas and Europe. Once it became clear that imperial 
strategies were doomed, it was also clear that a global order would lack a 
foundation without international organizations. And in the 1940s, the League and 
its satellites were the only international organizations. International 
organizations also helped to influence domestic policies both at home and 
abroad. Nevertheless, it might be erroneous to think of the international liberal 
coalition as monolithic. The fight against the Axis and then the Cold War 
polarization of the debate around the issue of Communism-Anticommunism hide 
important disagreements within the coalition and within their allies in Latin 
America. The Rockefeller Foundation networks of experts and international 
bureaucrats helped to build its capacity of influence and thus contributed to 
shape the aspirations of the United States to international hegemony.125 Yet, this 
view oversimplifies the entanglements of the Rockefeller Foundations, the 
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scientific experts, the League of Nations and the Latin American countries. 
Important power and ideological struggles were going on, even within the 
networks. These struggles reveals significant differences about how to think 
about development, progress, and human welfare. The international liberals in 
their interaction with Latin Americans produced diversity rather than an 
hegemonic project of economic development, what would be labeled later on 
theory of modernization. 
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